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Abstract
What is the philosophical significance of Heidegger’s interpretation of the
Japanese notion of kotoba (言葉) for Japanese philosophy? Was his conversa-
tion with Tezuka Tomio a real dialogue or not? To answer to these correlated
questions, I elucidate Heidegger’s 1954 essay “A Dialogue on Language” by
following a topological mode of thinking, and I inquire into the way-making of
a “thinking conversation”. First, I problematize whether Heidegger engaged in a
genuine dialogue with Tezuka. To that end, I distinguish the hermeneutic
horizon of the actual encounter between Tezuka and Heidegger from
Heidegger’s essay which places Tezuka (the Japanese) and Heidegger (the
Inquirer) in a fictional philosophical conversation. Second, I argue that
Heidegger’s topological method of interpretating kotoba can be read as a poetic
means of thematizing East-West dialogue. Third and finally, exploring the
topological sense of kotoba, I engage with third generation Kyoto School
thinker Ueda Shizuteru’s idea of “hollow words” of language, situated in a
twofold view of the world. I conclude that the true character of Heidegger’s
conversation with Tezuka can be identified neither in Heidegger’s “actual”
encounter with Tezuka, nor merely in Heidegger’s “hollow” essay. Departing
from Ueda’s account of kotoba, it appears that a genuine conversation with
language can be located in the dialogue of actuality and hollowness, which
finds it expression in poetic language.
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1 Introduction
What is the philosophical significance of Heidegger’s interpretation of the Japanese
notion of kotoba (言葉) for Japanese philosophy? Was his conversation with Tezuka
Tomio a real dialogue or not? To answer to these correlated questions, I elucidate
Heidegger’s essay “A Dialogue on Language” by following a topological mode of
thinking, and I inquire into the way-making of a “thinking conversation”. First, I
problematize whether Heidegger engaged in a genuine dialogue with Tezuka. To that
end, I distinguish the hermeneutic horizon of the actual encounter between Tezuka and
Heidegger from Heidegger’s essay which places Tezuka (the Japanese) and Heidegger
(the Inquirer) in a fictional philosophical conversation. Second, I argue that
Heidegger’s topological method of interpretating kotoba can be read as a poetic means
of thematizing East-West dialogue. Third and finally, exploring the topological sense of
kotoba, I engage with third generation Kyoto School thinker Ueda Shizuteru’s idea of
“hollow words” of language, situated in a twofold view of the world. I conclude that the
true character of Heidegger’s conversation with Tezuka can be identified neither in
Heidegger’s “actual” encounter with Tezuka, nor merely in Heidegger’s “hollow”
essay. Departing from Ueda’s account of kotoba, it appears that a genuine conversation
with language can be located in the dialogue of actuality and hollowness, which finds it
expression in poetic language.1
The main hypotheses of my arguments are the following: (1) In order to evaluate
whether Heidegger engaged in a genuine dialogue with Japanese philosophy, one must
examine his idea of a “thinking dialogue”. (2) Since any dialogue takes place in and of
language, one must investigate the way in which the language of the dialogue deter-
mines the nature of the dialogue. To test my arguments, I focus on Heidegger’s
dialogue 1953/54 essay “A Dialogue on Language”,2 which is where we find the
definition of a genuine philosophical dialogue. Following Heidegger and Tezuka’s
indications, an authentic philosophical conversation means awakening to the event of
stillness, attending to that which is hinted in the conversation without being objectified.
In topological terms, it is an act of “making space” rather than “taking up space” by
letting the stillness of language speak through the interlocutors. This is contrary to the
general idea of dialogue in the Western philosophy, usually considered simply as
1 Here I would like to offer to the reader an alternative order of reading the article. Those who are more
interested in the philosophical argumentation as to why Heidegger’s interpretation of kotoba is located
between actuality and hollowness, can read the fifth and last section entitled “5. Ueda’s kotoba: The Two-
way Movement in Language” (starting on page 13) immediately after the section entitled “2. Distinguishing
the Two Dialogues: The Meeting in Freiburg and Heidegger’s Essay” (starting on page 5). The reason I did not
organize the article accordingly has two reasons: first, I believe that in order to do justice to the core matter of
Heidegger’s essay on kotoba, which is the occurrence of stillness in a thinking dialogue that does not objectify
its subject matter, no conception of language should be provided in advance. In other words, Heidegger’s idea
of a dialogue with Japanese philosophy cannot be separated from the “way” of the dialogue itself. Second,
considering that historically it is Ueda who engages with Heidegger’s notion of being-in-the-world and
language, it is more fitting to place Ueda’s account after first having discussed Heidegger. Nonetheless, the
alternative reading that I have suggested above could show more directly why I emphasize the need to
distinguish the actual encounter between Heidegger and Tezuka from Heidegger’s philosophical essay, as I
use Ueda’s scheme of making sense of poetic language as a way to the bridge between actuality and
hollowness; world and the hollow expanse.
2 References to Heidegger’s Unterwegs zur Sprache (On the Way to Language) (1985) will be abbreviated as
US, followed by the page numbers first in the German, then in the English translation separated with a slash.
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mutual speech and simultaneous self-expression. In that regard, there is a need to
examine to what extent Heidegger’s interpretation of the Japanese word kotoba3
emerges from a genuine dialogue with Tezuka. Following that, I will explore Ueda’s
account of language in the last section of the article, which will help me situate
Heidegger’s dialogue with Tezuka and Japanese philosophy in the interplay of the
actuality and the hollowness of language.
2 Heidegger and Japanese Philosophy: A Conversation?
Determining the nature of the philosophical exchange between Heidegger and Japanese
philosophy is a complicated task.4 Heidegger had close contact with East Asian
philosophies already starting from the 1920s, as he received many visiting Japanese
students to attend his lecture courses.5 Insofar as Heidegger’s thought is a thinking of
the overcoming of Western metaphysics by bringing it back to its own limits
(US 103/20), its link with the Kyoto School (Kyōto-gakuha) in Japanese
philosophy holds a special place. It can be argued that the Kyoto School,
which originates from the philosophical dialogue between Nishida Kitarō and
Tanabe Hajime, emerges as a series of responses to the cultural, historical,
ideological and technological hegemony of the Western ontology, ethics and
logic. In that sense, the idea of the overcoming of nihilism is central to both
Heidegger and many Kyoto school thinkers. The Kyoto School philosophers
offered critical interpretations of Heidegger’s philosophy, as can be observed in
3 As discussed by Marra (2004) and Ma (2007), Watsuji Tetsurō offers one of the first comprehensive
interpretations of the word kotoba.
4 Heisig clarifies the hermeneutic ground and horizon of that very dialogue, as he writes: “in a sense (…) the
“east” that the Kyoto philosophers set up against the “west” they had constructed for themselves was also
something of an invention” (2001: 271). Indeed, this would be an invention that constantly interprets “the
other” from the standpoint of its “own” self-interpretation whose hermeneutic conditions are already pre-
established. Hence, the East-West dialogue today cannot depend only on the so-called “cross-cultural”
dialogues, if that solely implies the inter-subjective confrontation of two worlds radically separated from
one another, since the boundaries of those worlds are neither well-defined nor fixed.
5 Some critics indicate that Heidegger’s position concerning the possibility of an East-West conversation is
problematic. For instance, Ma argues that according to Heidegger the European languages seem immune to
“corruption” (Ma, 2007: 172). What that implies is that it is only the Western logos that is capable of distorting
the Eastern spirit, but not the other way around. According to this distorted power dynamic, the latter is
represented as weak, passive and receptive, while the former is powerful, transformative and influential. Thus,
Heidegger seems to make sense of the intercultural relation at issue as an asymmetric one. However, this is not
the only difficulty. Graham Parkes offers the following remarks in his Rising Sun Over Black Forest: “While
the documentation that would decide the question appears to be lacking, there is one consideration that
militates in favour of the possibility that Heidegger learned of, and was influenced by, the idea of nothingness
that was being developed by Nishida during the 1920s—and which would come to assume, in the form of
“absolute nothingness”, a central place in the philosophy of the Kyoto School” (May, 1996: 93). Accordingly,
if Tanabe Hajime, who was a student in Freiburg at the time to study with Husserl and Heidegger,
disseminated Nishida’s ideas in the 1920s, it is possible that initially it was not Heidegger who had an
influence on East Asian philosophers, but on the contrary, it was Heidegger who developed key aspects of his
philosophy with strong influences from them. After all, as reported by Inaga (2013), Heidegger’s very idea of
in-der-Welt-sein (being-in-the-world) may have been a borrowing from Okakuro Kakuzō’s 1906 work The
Book of Tea (Cha no hon), a Daoist idea stemming from Zhuangzi. Accordingly, it was Itō Kichinosuke who
first gave the book to Heidegger, and it is possible that Heidegger made a free use of that term. For more on
this, see Bret Davis’s “Heidegger and Asian Philosophy” (Davis, 2013).
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the thought of Nishida Kitarō, Tanabe Hajime, Watsuji Tetsurō –who were
students of Raphael von Köbel (Ma, 2007: 11)–, which paved the way for the
long and fruitful philosophical debate between Heidegger scholarship and Jap-
anese philosophy.
Still, one might ask: why was Heidegger so appealing for the Kyoto School
philosophers, especially given the exclusive nature of Heidegger’s understanding of
the Western history of metaphysics? Likewise, how come so many Heidegger scholars
come into close contact with Japanese philosophy? According to Heidegger, the
possibility of restoring the history of the West –a history of forgetfulness of the
question of being– depends on experiencing the so-called historical dialogue between
the Greeks (where Western philosophy flourished through thinkers such as Anaximan-
der, Heraclitus and Parmenides) and the Germans (where Western philosophy comes to
its end through Nietzsche’s thought).6 Despite this onto-historical reading that Heideg-
ger develops in the 1930s and 40s, and continues to express –though more sparingly–
even as late as the 1950s (for instance Der Spiegel interview), there is also another, and
much more inclusive vein of thought that comes to the fore in his later philosophy,
which is more promising for a dialogical mode of reflection.
It is plausible to think that Heidegger’s later “poetic thinking”, as an explicit
confrontation with the origins of Western philosophy via a reconsideration of the
essence of language, has proved to be an important bridge between him and Japanese
thought. This new manner of thought that he developed in the 50s and early 60s, which
shows many similarities to Zen thinking, has drawn much interest from the third and
fourth generation Kyoto school thinkers such as Ueda Shizuteru, Tsujimura Kōichi, and
Ōhashi Ryōsuke. These thinkers have especially engaged with Heidegger’s later
thought, more so than their predecessors such as Nishida, Nishitani and Tanabe
(Krummel, 2013). According to Heidegger, the overcoming of nihilism, or Gestell as
the essence of modern technology, first requires a transformation of our relation to
language. The overcoming at issue requires a hermeneutic re-orientation vis-à-vis the
destructive nature of our age that is defined by the endless “will to will” (Davis, 2007:
148) and limitless machination, which also enframes language. We must learn anew
how to “say” things by listening to language itself without determining language solely
as the tool of communication. This is related to Heidegger’s idea of being as “letting”
(lassen), which leads to his thought of Gelassenheit, namely “letting-be”, or
“releasement”. As such, a conversation with language must take place in the region
of “letting-be”, so that we can make sense of what it means to “think” via language in a
new manner.
In that line of thinking, one of the topics that come to the fore in Heidegger’s later
philosophy is the nature of a philosophical dialogue, or a conversation (Gespräch),
between different “houses of being” (US 85/5). Although Heidegger did not speak any
6 Commentators such as Mizoguchi find the basic underpinnings of Heidegger’s reading disputable (1987:
198). This is important especially considered within the context of the idea of “world philosophies”. What
should be the language that determines the core matter of “philosophy”? Morisato’s remarks on this issue are
worth noting for opening to discussion different definitions and descriptions of what philosophy is and how
the very act of thinking is to be conceived, especially with regard to the Europeanization of “philosophy” by
(Morisato, 2019: 23–24).
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East Asian languages,7 his interest in learning about Chinese (Hsiao, 1987: 98) and
Japanese (Tezuka, 1996: 62) words, concepts and philosophical ideas is well known. It
is precisely in that context that re-interpreting the meaning of “language” from the point
of view of diverse linguistic backgrounds appears to be essential.8 Heidegger himself
began to realize the necessity of engaging with Asian philosophies in the 1950s, which
suggests a change in his earlier position from the 1930s and 1940s. In his On the Way
to Language, Heidegger explicitly mentions the notion of dao (道) as the “way” of
thinking and being, even if only in passing (US 187/92), which has drawn the attention
of contemporary cross-cultural thinkers (Davis et al., 2011: 4). Nonetheless, what still
needs to be questioned here regarding the idea of a genuine dialogue with Asian
philosophies, and more specifically with the Kyoto School in Japanese philosophy, is
the following: Does “the foreign”, as mentioned in The Ister lecture courses in 1942,
remains only a passage to one’s own (Heidegger, 1993), or does engaging with the
foreign also appropriate us in a way that it determines how we make sense of our own?
Examining the 1953/54 essay “A Dialogue on Language” will help us determine
whether Heidegger’s attempt to get in a dialogue with Japanese culture and philosophy
can be considered to be a successful attempt. In that regard, the language of that
conversation, as the site of that hermeneutic re-orientation between Heidegger and
Japanese philosophy, must be examined.
3 Distinguishing the Two Dialogues: The Meeting in Freiburg
and Heidegger’s Essay
Tezuka Tomio (1903–83), who was a professor in German literature at the Tokyo
University, met with Heidegger at the end of March 1954 in Freiburg (Tezuka, 1996:
61). Although the intended topic of their conversation was the significance of present-
day Christianity, they went on to talk about many other subjects relating to Japanese
arts, philosophy, language and culture, including prominent figures like Kuki Shūzō
and Suzuki Daisetsu. Tezuka already had a profound understanding of Heidegger’s
thought of language and poetry, thus, he wanted to hear from Heidegger more on
Rilke’s poetry, while Heidegger wanted to learn more about Japan, Zen thinking and
Japanese language (Tezuka, 1996: 62).
The meeting results in somewhat conflicting accounts: first, Heidegger’s philosoph-
ical essay, which I will examine, and second, Tezuka’s bibliographical report entitled
“An Hour with Heidegger”, published in Japan in 1955. May claims that Tezuka’s
report is a valuable document, writing: “in so far as it figures in a series of
7 In view of this, Lin Ma rightfully asks: “What is prima facie bewildering is that, if Heidegger considers that a
“sufficient” discussion of East Asian languages is of crucial importance, if he deems that East Asian thought
can make important contributions to a thinking beyond traditional metaphysics, if he attaches importance to
hearing things in their original tongue, why, instead of taking sufficient initiative to learn a bit more about
these languages, for a long stretch of years, he reiterates from time to time his ignorance of the original East
Asian languages?” (Ma, 2007: 145).
8 As Bret Davis remarks (2020: 47), Kida Gen’s idea of “anti-philosophy” (han-tetsugaku), which considers
philosophers like Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida in the same league of anti-Platonism, (Kida, 2014: 50–51)
is thought-provoking. While this is not necessarily a novel approach, formulating “anti-philosophy” as a
negation of “tetsugaku”, which is the literal Japanese translation of the Greek word philosophia as “love of
wisdom”, has important implications for what “Japanese philosophy” means.
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consequential conversations Heidegger had with East Asian scholars. It also shows
how highly Heidegger valued East Asian culture and how deeply it interested him”
(1996:12). Indeed, a reader who lacks an overall idea of Japanese culture, language and
philosophy, with no access to the biographical context of the conversation, can easily
believe that Heidegger’s understanding of kotoba and other mentioned aspects related
to Japanese culture are genuine interpretations. However, it is interesting to note that
Tezuka’s biographical description of their meeting suggests that Heidegger made use of a
much freer interpretation of Tezuka’s explanations, especially regarding the meaning of the
word kotoba (Tezuka, 1996: 62). Here I would like to emphasize the need to distinguish the
content of the actual encounter from the philosophical essay.According to Tezuka’s report, the
encounter does not seem to result in a genuine philosophical dialogue. The essay, which is
loosely based on the same encounter, however, tries to show the way towards an appropriate
philosophical dialogue. In other words, the two texts have different purposes and interests. In
the German text, Heidegger is named “the Inquirer” (F: Fragende) and Tezuka as “a
Japanese” (J: ein Japaner). The sense of anonymity conveyed here must be on purpose,
precisely because Heidegger wants to highlight that what is at issue is a fictional piece of
writing.Heidegger has no interest in reporting the details of the actual encounter that took place
between him and Tezuka. Therefore, the fact that Heidegger’s essay differs from the actual
encounter cannot be used as an argument against Heidegger to claim that there was not a real
dialogue between the two interlocutors. Nonetheless, this does not mean either that the overall
framework of the philosophical conversation is obvious, which requires further hermeneutic
scrutiny. The answer regarding the true content and subjectmatter of the dialogue, aswell as its
philosophical intentions and results, is somewhere between the informal meeting and the
published philosophical essay.
To appropriately make sense of Heidegger’s conversation with Tezuka, let me
clarify the hermeneutic background of the essay. First, we should note that the original
title of the essay conveys a different meaning compared to its English translation - A
Dialogue on Language - as it literally says Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache: From
a conversation of the language. As such, the title of the English translation is not fitting
considering the main ideas that are issued in the essay. As Parkes astutely notes, “the
interlocutors strive to avoid speaking about language, trying rather to let the conversa-
tion be led by and issue from the essential being of language itself (vom Wesen der
Sprache her)” (Parkes, 1987: 213). While the piece is placed at the beginning of the
English translation of US, in the German original it appears as the third essay, preceded
by Die Sprache (The Language) (1950), which is not included in the English transla-
tion, and Die Sprache im Gedicht: Eine Erörterung von Georg Trakls Gedicht (Lan-
guage in the Poem: A Discussion on Georg Trakl’s Poetic Work) (1952).9
The order in which the essays are presented to us in Heidegger’s work has important
hermeneutic implications with regard to the possibility of an appropriate understanding
of the conversation. For instance, the first essay of the book problematizes the question
of language from a topological standpoint (Ziarek, 2013: 135) by making an issue of
our standing within the limits of language. Here Heidegger attempts to develop a
hermeneutic “method” of interpreting the poetic essence of language, which requires
9 In the dialogue, the inquirer lets his interlocutor know that “he kept the lecture appearing in print”, hesitating
about the fact whether he managed to avoid speaking about language in this lecture (US 139/49), which may
be the reason why Hofstadter decided to leave this essay out.
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a confrontation with our relation to language. The second essay offers an exegetic
analysis of Trakl’s poetry while still operating against the background of the first essay.
The two essays are complementary in a way that they introduce and put to work the very
idea of Erörterung, which can be roughly translated into English as “situating-discussion” or
“discussion that situates”. Heidegger writes: “Die Sprache erörtern heißt, nicht so sehr sie,
sondern uns an denOrt ihresWesens bringen: Versammlung in das Ereignis” (US 10). Albert
Hofstadter translates the sentence as follows: “To discuss language, to place it, means to bring
to its place of being not so much language as ourselves: our own gathering into the
appropriation” (Heidegger, 2001: 188). However, an alternative translation could emphasize
the key issuemore explicitly.My own translation would run as follows: “Discussing language
does not so much mean situating it (language), but rather bringing ourselves into the place of
its essence: gathering in the appropriation”. It is no coincidence that the second essay also starts
with a series of topological remarks that discusses the relationship between Erörterung as
“situating-discussing” and Ort as “place” (US 37/159), problematizing the site of Georg
Trakl’s poetry. What must be emphasized here is that our relation to that which we are trying
to interpret depends on the place of thinking. The task is not to place an object in front of us to
have a better view of it, but rather to situate ourselves in accordance with the way in which it
shows itself to us. Such a change in orientation is also what is necessary as a change in our
comportment towards the core matter of the conversation between Heidegger and Tezuka.
Within that context, it can be stated that Heidegger’s essay has two dimensions. First,
Heidegger problematizes the ground and horizon of a thinking dialogue with Japanese
philosophy. Here, the implicit goal of Heidegger is to arrive at the openness of language to
be able to interpret the Japanese word kotoba (言葉). Second, Heidegger presents his
interpretation of the word kotoba, which translates as “foliage of speech” (Ma, 2007: 177)
or more literally as the “leaves of things” (Marra, 2004: 562) in line with his own thought of
a thinking conversation that emerges from stillness. The latter becomes possible as far as the
first is attended.We need to avoid seeing the dialogue not as an attempt to designate a notion
of language as if the aimwas to bring up a “philosophy of language”.With these preliminary
remarks, now it will be easier to conceive what is stake in the conversation between
Heidegger and Tezuka with regard to Heidegger’s relation to Japanese philosophy and the
notion of kotoba.
4 The Way of the Conversation: The Way to kotoba
The first necessary step in interpreting the conversation is to acknowledge silence, or
perhaps more appropriately said, stillness (Stille), as the essential characteristic of the
speaking of language.10 Before we come to speak about language, language itself
speaks via stillness as we become its listeners and interpreters.11 Thus, the Inquirer
asks:
10 Heidegger specifically underlines this point in italics: “Die Sprache spricht als das Geläut der Stille” (US
27/205).
11 Kotoh astutely summarizes the role of stillness/silence in Heidegger’s later thought: “It is not logos, but the
silence as the “basic mood/voice” (Grundstimme) that encounters the wonder of the presencing of being.” His
concluding remarks are worth reconsidering: “One should listen […] belongingly to the sound of silence,
which constantly emanates from the depths of the indescribable, and continue to let this be the source of one’s
own language” (1987: 211).
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I: What does the Japanese world understand by language? Asked still more
cautiously: Do you have in your language a word for what we call language? If
not, how do you experience what with us is called language?
J: No one has ever asked me that question. And it seems to me also that we in our
own Japanese world pay no heed to what you are asking me now. I must beg you,
then, to allow me a few moments of reflection. (The Japanese closes his eyes,
lowers his head, and sinks into a long reflection. The Inquirer waits until his guest
resumes the conversation.)
(…) There is a Japanese word that says the essential being of language, rather
than being of use as a name for speaking and for language. (US 108/23)
Obviously, as Heidegger was drafting the essay, he already knew from their actual
encounter that the Japanese word at issue was kotoba. However, at this point of the
dialogue, this “wondrous word” is not given away. If Heidegger’s goal was to merely
provide an aesthetic image of the Japanese word for language, he could have done this
at the very beginning by discoursing about the word kotoba, which is clearly not the
case. Here we should also note the theatrical air that we hear in Heidegger’s words.
Heidegger’s Japanese colleague takes his time as he “sinks into a long reflec-
tion”. What Heidegger wants to emphasize is that an ideal philosophical
conversation cannot be a hasty exchange of opinions and information. Both
interlocutors take their time, which frees the necessary space for thought. Thus,
Heidegger’s interlocutors resist saying the word kotoba explicitly until it be-
comes impossible to retain the word any longer.
As the Inquirer and the Japanese think that it may be too early to venture an
interpretation –since they may come to objectify the Japanese word for language as a
mere definition of language– they change the topic, bringing us to the enigmatic role of
the notion of iki (粋). While it is usually thought that the discussion on iki does not add
anything significant for the concerns of the conversation, this would mean that we are
missing an essential point. The way in which the notion of iki is introduced during the
conversation is key to understanding the nature of the thinking dialogue,12 in the same
way that the meaning of kotoba comes to the fore via the stillness of the conversation.
Although the notion simply means “‘chic’ or ‘elegance’, or, as an adjective, ‘elegant,
chic, delicate, smart, pretty, refined, tasteful”’ (May, 1996: 19), as we shall see,
Heidegger’s version significantly differs. In the conversation, we confront the difficulty
of talking about the meaning of iki, which results from the lack of a common horizon of
understanding. In other words, Heidegger’s introduction of iki has a specific purpose: it
is intended to help the readers to realize the hermeneutic possibility of making sense of
kotoba. Recalling his earlier conversations with Kuki, who is represented as a former
colleague and student of his (although biographically this is not the truth), the Inquirer
reminds to the Japanese about the similar kind of difficulties that he faced himself:
I: The danger of our dialogues was hidden in language itself, not in what we
discussed, nor in the way in which we tried to do so. (US 85/4)
12 Parkes claims that “there is no inherent connection between iki and koto” (1987: 215). Yet he also adds that
thinking the meaning of koto as the matter (Sache) of language is what brings out the stillness of iki, while
reflecting on the stillness of iki refers us to kotoba itself.
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The obvious danger at hand was that the language of the dialogue would shift
everything into European discourse. The hermeneutic problem is clear: if iki is a
Japanese expression, and, if the language of the dialogue is German, then how one
should interpret the meaning of iki within the boundaries of the German language?
How can we avoid transforming the original context and background of the Japanese
conception and refrain from interpreting the meaning of iki from a horizon of under-
standing to which it does not belong? Stated otherwise, what must the middle ground of
the discussion be, which will gather its interlocutors in the same openness of lan-
guage?13 The question does not have a predefined answer, since no pre-conception of
language must guide and pre-determine the way of thinking. What that implies is that
we must arrive at the way of language by allowing our subject matter, that is, language,
to orient us within the context of the inquiry. As such, the act of listening, which takes
place in and through stillness, is the more originary ground of any dialogue, which is
why the Japanese suggests:
J: We Japanese do not think it strange if a dialogue leaves undefined what is
really intended, or even restores it back to the keeping of the undefinable. (US 95/
13)
Here it can be seen that according to Heidegger, the Japanese has a completely unique
experience of “conversation” –and of language– in comparison to speakers of Western
languages. As the interlocutors search for a way to clarify the meaning of iki, the
guiding question turns out to be: “how European aesthetics might be suitable to give a
higher clarity to what endows our art and poetry with their nature?” (US 95/13).
Although the difference between the sensuous and the supra-sensuous figures in the
Japanese aesthetics in an equivalent way in Western metaphysics, the nuance itself can
be hardly grasped from the standpoint of European languages and metaphysical
concepts that are at work. In that regard, interlocutors call the way in which the words
grant themselves in the dialogue “a delicate gesture”, namely, a beckoning, or hinting
(winken). What we achieve when we say something amounts to a specific mode of
“showing”. Showing here does not simply indicate a linguistic process of signification,
but rather it means letting the other see. One example of such a gesture comes from the
Japanese Nō drama.14 Heidegger’s Japanese interlocutor reminds us that the Japanese
scene is often empty, which requires the uncommon concentration of the spectators.
Again, since what is of utmost importance in a thinking dialogue is letting the stillness
speak, the Japanese way of attending is put forward as the ideal way of letting and
space-making. Accordingly, the Japanese adds that even the slightest hand gesture of
the actor must be attended in a particular way:
13 Here I am here referring to Gadamer’s idea of language as die Mitte, which is the middle ground that gathers
its interlocutors where a common horizon of understanding emerges for understanding (Gadamer, 1999: 384,
387).
14 As May shows evidence (1996: 17–18), Heidegger’s real source in identifying this element in Japanese
culture is German professor of Japanology, Oscar Benl, specifically his 1952 treaty, Zeami Motokiyo and the
Spirit of Nō Drama: Esoteric Aesthetic Writings from the Fifteenth Century.
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J: For instance, if a mountain landscape is to appear, the actor slowly raises his
open hand and holds it quietly above his eyes at eyebrow level. May I show
you?
I: Please do.
(The Japanese raises and holds his hand as described.)
I: That is indeed a gesture with which a European will hardly be content. (US
102/18)
The European spectator is not content, because he is used to the expressive movements
of the European performer, which objectifies the phenomenon in bringing it into view.
The Japanese performer, however, points towards the emptiness that encircles phe-
nomena, which is the undefinable openness from which phenomena appears in their
own way. When the gesture emerges from emptiness, one needs a kind of attentiveness
that is attuned to the boundlessness in question. The receptivity that is necessary allows
the “hint” to move freely from emptiness. Here, Heidegger’s critique of the technical-
aesthetic mode of representation that imprisons objects, events and landscapes in
“frames” comes to the fore, as he suggests that “the East-asian world, and the
technical-aesthetic product of the film industry are incompatible” (US 100/17). Ac-
cording to the Inquirer, there can be no such thing as Japanese cinema, since “photo-
graphic objectification is already a consequence of the ever wider outreach of
Europeanisation”. Here we can argue that the discussion of the delicate gesture that
exists in the Nō drama illustrates the kind of relation that one needs to hold to what is
beckoned in the dialogue, which requires the same kind of attentiveness for the
interpretation of the word kotoba. Hence, Heidegger’s interlocutors designate iki as
“grace”, in the sense of the “pure delight of the calling stillness” (US 134/44). Iki is
interpreted as the expression of the aesthetic gesture that by which we bear and
encounter the emergence of a thing from emptiness or nothingness.15 In other words,
iki opens the way to kotoba. The way of a “thinking conversation” requires a collab-
orative act of non-violence and letting.16
In the existing literature, the question as to whether we can speak of a genuine
dialogue between Heidegger and Tezuka has received mixed answers. In general, there
are two lines of thinking. The first approach deals more with the form of the dialogue
(May, 1996) while the second focuses more on the content (Marra, 2004). On the one
hand, Reinhard May’s account shows in detail why the actual encounter differs highly
from the content of Heidegger’s essay. May astutely draws attention to the following
point in regard with the existing scholarship on the essay: “In any case, it has
15 Heidegger’s emphasis on the stillness of language as the true mood or attunement (Stimmung) and voice
(Stimme) of our saying is an important idea, and offers a strong critique of the traditional logocentric notion of
language observed in Western metaphysics from Aristotle to Humboldt in various forms. Heidegger’s turn
toward stillness as the essence of language is also a turn toward no-thingness as the essence of being. In that
context, what Heidegger’s essay establishes is a shift in thinking by moving from phenomenological ontology
to hermeneutic meontology, that is, moving from the thinking of being to the thinking the place of non-being,
or nothingness. This can be traced back to Heidegger’s famous inaugural addressWhat is Metaphysics (1929),
delivered at the University of Freiburg.
16 In a certain sense, such a conversation involves what Gadamer calls the “fusion of horizons” (1999). If the
language of the conversation is the primary language of one of the interlocutors, the speaker of the host
language must be ready to appropriately accommodate the other interlocutor, which may mean, being open to
be transformed linguistically.
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apparently not been suggested that the text represents exclusively Heidegger’s own
work, and that all passages in it are thus to be ascribed to Heidegger himself” (May,
1996: 13).17 In addition to that, point, May points towards the influence of Laozi’s and
Zhuangzi’s ideas on Heidegger, especially with regard to the notion of “the way-
making of language”. On the other hand, the commentary of Michael Marra (2004)
provides a philosophical answer to the question that Heidegger poses in the essay: what
is the Japanese word for language? (Marra, 2004: 555). In Heidegger’s essay, Tezuka’s
answer to that question is kotoba, in the sense of “petals that stem from koto” (US 136/
47) (more on this below). Since a comprehensive understanding of the meaning of
kotoba requires an interpretation of koto, Marra goes on to offer a detailed study of the
difference between the concepts of koto and mono to differentiate the thinghood of
things from particular things as entities, similar to Heidegger’s ontological difference
between Sein (being) and Seiende (beings) (Marra, 2004, 556).
Now, while it is true that the meaning of the word kotoba plays a significant role in
Heidegger’s essay, Heidegger does not stand in an appropriate hermeneutic position to
be able to interpret the Japanese word for language. Heidegger’s lack of proficiency in
East Asian languages drew him back from engaging with Japanese and Chinese in a
more direct way. (Ma, 2007, 146–148). And this is related to the fact that the discussion
about the meaning of kotoba first appears through the middle section of the conversa-
tion, taking up a more principal place only towards the end of the essay (US 108/45).
The hermeneutic possibility of discoursing on and about language first depends on the
possibility of establishing a ground for mutual understanding. The very meaning and
philosophical implications of kotoba must show itself in accordance with the “way-
making” of the conversation.
5 Heidegger’s kotoba: “Leaves of Speech”
As the Inquirer brings back in focus the hinting of the “beckoning stillness”, the
Japanese offers a preliminary interpretation of kotoba:
J: Up to this moment I have shied away from that word, because I must give a
translation which makes our word for language look like a mere pictograph, to
wit, something that belongs within the precincts of conceptual ideas: for Euro-
pean science and its philosophy try to grasp the nature of language only by way
of concepts.
I: What is the Japanese word for "language"?
J: (after further hesitation) It is "Koto ba."
I: And what does that say?
J: bameans leaves, including and especially the leaves of a blossom-petals. Think
of cherry blossoms or plum blossoms. (US 134/45)
It must be acknowledged that the word kotoba has an interesting yet complex etymo-
logical background, and Heidegger’s interpretation adds a second layer of complexity.
17 May mentions Michiko Yoneda’s work Gespräch und Dichtung: Ein Auseinandersetzungsversuch der
Sprachauffassung Heideggers mit einem japanischen Sagen as a similar approach (May, 1996:14n1).
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His interpretation is not an interpretation that prioritizes philological accuracy, but
rather poetic creativity. On the one hand, the second part of the word ba (ha) simply
means “leaves” of a tree or a flower and can invoke a sense of density and abundance.
Heidegger’s Japanese interlocutor interprets this as the “leaves of a blossom”, which is
linguistically not necessarily the case. On the other hand, Tezuka himself writes that the
sense of koto at issue is related to kotogara (事柄) meaning “event”, thus the koto of
kotoba is twofold: koto as matter or thing and koto as the expression of that happening
(Tezuka, 1996: 62). Graham Parkes explains the etymology of kotoba by drawing on
the Chinese characters that we see in the Japanese word. Accordingly, the first part,
koto, signifies the sense of end and origin, −edge or border– beginning and end (Parkes,
1987: 214). It should be interesting for Heidegger to observe a semantic parallel
between the German Ort and the Japanese koto, as the German word for place Ort
also has a similar meaning of edge and limit.18 In that vein of thinking, for Heidegger,
the word kotoba implies the “emergence of the flower petals” in their journeying from
silence to speech and vice versa. Indeed, for Heidegger, what matters the most is to be
able to elucidate the primordial emergence of a thing (Ding) as a meaningful entity.
Accordingly, the word reflects the emergence of our experience of the manifestation of
phenomena, arriving to the sign as the sounded word. The journey of words springs
from silence, passes through signs, and descends back to stillness –for the sign can
never exhaust the subject matter of our speech. Stated otherwise, the dictionary words
touch upon the matter of our speaking, but they cannot capture the movement of
saying. Thus, we need the poetic word, and in fact, poetic speech consists of “hints”
that un-conceal a way toward the site of where things occur meaningfully. They can no
longer be treated as mere signs. In this locus, thinking by listening, or as one might
even say, thinking as listening occurs, which is the nature of language that admits us
into the limits of a dialogue.
Heidegger’s poetic interpretation can be more specifically called poietic in that it
creatively aims to make-space for a new interpretation of language: the words’ journey
toward stillness is also their homecoming, which is the same journey of the petals
descending back to the earth. When koto and ba are put together, kotoba expresses the
verbal essence of language in the sense of bringing things into language, describing the
emergence of words in abundance from and through stillness. The notion that Heideg-
ger wishes to emphasize here implies that the core issue of language is not only a
transfer of meanings from one mouth to another, which the more ordinary word for
language gengo (言語) could convey (Marra, 2004: 555), but the very unfolding of
meaningfulness itself that underpins the very origin of any understanding. The move-
ment that saying enacts in language is the same gathering of the roots and the
blossoming petals in and of place. The topological dialogue between the place and
the way of language should not escape our attention: the upward movement from the
roots to the petals embodies the downward movement from the petals to the roots. The
flower petals that silently blossom from the earth are the words that offer themselves as
the beckoning of the earth. The white and rose petals of plum and cherry blossoms are
18 “The idea of place as tied to a notion of gathering or ‘focus’ is also suggested by the etymology of the
German term for place,Ort, according to which the term originally indicated the point or edge of a weapon the
point of a spear, for instance —at which all of the energy of the weapon is brought to bear” (Malpas, 2006:
29).
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the hints of the fruits. The word, belonging to the domain of the nameless, emerges
freely from the place and becomes the way of the conversation.19
Upon the Japanese interlocutor’s designation of kotoba as “the petals that stem from
koto”, the Inquirer states that “That is a wondrous word, and therefore inexhaustible to
our thinking. It names something other than our names, understood metaphysically,
present to us language, glossa, lingua, langue” (US 136/47). Here Heidegger can
indeed be criticized, as it is not clear as to how and why the Japanese word should
be exempt from our metaphysical way of thinking about the nature of language. For
instance, the metaphysical essence of the word “being” does not lie in what it signifies,
rather in how we happen to make sense of it as the ground and essence of beings (rather
than the inexhaustible manifestation of the meaningfulness of things). Likewise, the
word language itself, whether expressed as kotoba or Sprache, is neither metaphysical
nor non-metaphysical in itself. In the later stages of the essay, as the Inquirer hesitates
to speak more directly about the meaning of kotoba, the Japanese interlocutor finds
himself in an odd position. While it was previously the Inquirer who adopted the more
hesitant comportment, now, despite the Japanese interlocutor’s willingness to elaborate
on the implications of kotoba, he takes a step back. This theatrical interplay of
hesitation and reticence leads the interlocutors back to reconsidering the nature of a
dialogue, which is represented as the “hermeneutic circle” (US 142/51). At this point,
we reach the limits of the dialogue on kotoba:
I: A dialogue that would remain originarily appropriated to Saying.
J: But then, not every talk between people could be called a dialogue any
longer.
I: … if we from now on hear this word as though it named for us a focusing on
the reality of language.
J: In this sense, then, even Plato's Dialogues would not be dialogues?
I: I would like to leave that question open, and only point out that the kind of
dialogue is determined by that which speaks to those who seemingly are the only
speakers–men. (US 143/52)
As can be seen, the conversation remains open to the domain of the unsayable. This is
the ultimate point of the dialogue, which arrives at the topos of reticence: silence about
silence, or rather, stillness about stillness. The dialogue leaves us thinking about the
essence of the twofold nature of language and stillness, while problematizing the nature
of a thinking conversation. In the next and concluding section, let me involve Ueda in
that conversation to deal with the relationship between the stillness of words and our
poetic experience of the world. In doing so, we can leave behind Heidegger’s precon-
ception that the Japanese word for language tends to be a non-metaphysical one only
for being a non-Western word. As such, the meaning of kotoba can also be elucidated
from a Japanese point of view.
19 May states that Heidegger’s dialogue can be read as his account of dao as “the Way” (May, 1996: 20), a
concept which indeed appears in the later essays of US (187/98).
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6 Ueda’s kotoba: The Two-Way Movement in Language
Can we ever be silent about silence as Heidegger and Tezuka concluded? What kind of
a topos would that be? The third generation Kyoto School philosopher Ueda
Shizuteru’s thought of language engages precisely with these issues relating to the
nature of human subjectivity. Bret Davis locates Ueda’s philosophy, along with the
latter’s predecessors Nishida and Nishitani, within the philosophical conversation
between Zen and Western philosophy (2019: 714). In relation with that it must also
be underlined that Ueda’s thought of language has topological underpinnings, which
are obviously in dialogue with Nishida and Heidegger. In a nutshell, the primary
objective of Nishida’s philosophy was to locate the pure experience of things in the
world via his “logic of place” (basho no ronri 場所の 理) beyond the confines of the
perennial object-subject dichotomy. According to Nishida’s philosophy, a pure expe-
rience can take place in a state of being where one does not identify oneself as a subject
over and against objects. Within that regard, by placing philosophy of Zen in a dialogue
with the Western thought, the aim of Ueda’s philosophy of language is to identify the
relation between experience and expression. Dealing with Ueda’s account at this point
will help clarify my arguments on Heidegger’s dialogue with Japanese philosophy,
while providing a more complete account of the notion of kotoba.
Ueda’s philosophy of language situates in a field where important aspects of
hermeneutic phenomenology and Zen coincide. Davis suggests that one of the basic
issues of Zen for Ueda was the necessary commuting between silence, as demonstrated
in seated meditation (zazen 座禅), and speech, as appears in the verbal encounters with
teachers, which may include the reciting of kōans. (Davis, 2019: 714). We can clearly
see that lively tension between silence and speech in Ueda’s thought, as he writes:
The words of language (kotoba) show things, events, or states-of-affairs (koto).
Words express or manifest things; at times they can be said to manifest while
expressing them. Therein lies the power of language. Moreover, as things are
revealed, they disappear as words. This is the wonder of language. In the process
of showing something, a word disappears as word and in its place something
appears as something. (Ueda, 2011: 766)
What that means is, most of the time we hear meanings, that is, that which is signified,
but not the language itself. In turn, as soon as we try to hear language itself, we lose the
ordinary meanings. In that sense, as Ueda argues explicitly, language appears both as
that which makes possible the experience of a world and that which limits our
experience of it (Ueda, 2011: 766). If so, what is the relation between the world and
language? For Ueda, being-in-the-world, a notion that he draws from Heidegger’s early
thought, is fundamentally two-fold. While the meanings in the world are constituted
linguistically, there is also a second dimension of the world which is pre-or even non-
conceptual. This topos, which Ueda calls “hollow expanse”, encompasses the two-fold
nature of the world and language, and is the source of a pure experience of the world.
Let me expand on that.
Explaining his two-fold view of the world, Ueda interprets the poem of a fourth
grader who lived near the lake Nojiri in Nagano prefecture. The title of the poem is
“Evening Glow”, which reads and is translated as follows:
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Kurohimeyama to Myōkōsan no ma ni hi wa shizumu
Sonotoki mikan-iro no kumo ga
Sūtto watashi no me no mae o tōru
Ichinichi no dekigoto o nosete kumo wa ugoku
Watashi ga gakkō de benkyō shite ita no wa
Mite irudarou ka
The sun sets between Mt Kurohime and Mt Myōkō;
Just then an orange cloud
Smoothly passes before my eyes.
Carrying the day’s events, the cloud drifts along.
I was studying at school—
Is it watching that, I wonder? (Ueda, 2011: 772).
Ueda draws our attention to the fourth line of the poem, which apparently shows a
significant contrast with the preceding three lines, where mere “state of affairs” of this
world are described. However, the fourth line, “Carrying the day’s events, the cloud
drifts along”, does not only designate what things are, but brings our attention back to
the way in which the world becomes a matter of experience in language. It is key to
note that core matter of the fourth line can only be said in language: “The clouds carry
the day’s events, drifting along”. This is not a mere description of the things in the
world, namely not an “event” that is readily available to our understanding. It is only
accessible through the happening of kotoba itself. What that means is that language
expresses a “hollow” thing (Ueda, 2011: 774) that is distinct from things themselves.
The nature of things must be experienced by commuting this hollow expanse of
meaningfulness, which is implicated in the last line: “Is it watching that, I wonder”.
Here, one is no longer the subject of the act of seeing, but one becomes the object of the
cloud. By taking a step back from the place of one’s ego, which constitutes the ordinary
knowledge of world, one finds oneself in the place of pure experience as a “selfless
self”. Ueda describes this as follows: “While actually existing in the world, at the same
time we hollowly exist in the limitless openness in which the world is located. By
means of language we, who are located in this twofold manner, come to awaken to our
actual hollow existence” (Ueda, 2011: 776). According to Ueda, “hollow words”,
which are preserved essentially in poetic language, can hint to us the nature of
language, as well as our being placed in language where human subjectivity appears
as a “no-self” (Ueda, 2011: 765–766). Hollow words, then, allow us to understand the
meaning of words, while also providing the space to make sense of the happening of
language itself from “nothing” (mu 無) (Davis, 2019: 718). This is indicative of a
marriage of a hermeneutic-phenomenological manner of thinking with a philosophy of
Zen, both of which are expressed in topological terms, denoting how and why the issue
is linked with the place and limit of language. The happening of kotoba is the same as
the happening of the world in its two-fold nature. In that context, Ueda’s interpretation
of the fourth line of the poem refers to the limit-experience of language where the
hermeneutic movement I have mentioned emerges from stillness and returns to stillness
via words.
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The hermeneutic movement at issue revolves around the limits of language, and in
that regard, it encompasses the linguistic core of language from inside and outside. Let
me clarify that from a topological point of view. The fourth line reads: “The clouds
carry the day’s events, drifting along”. According to Ueda, this is where we enter into
language, while at the same time exit from it where the signification of worldly objects
occurs. While exiting from the boundaries of the world, we enter into the hollow
expanse from which our originary experience of the world originates. The fourth line,
thus, is what opens our understanding to language itself, while also delimiting our
ordinary–everyday understanding of things and events. In turn, the fifth and the sixth
lines bring us back to the world, yet this time from the opposite direction of the
hermeneutic movement. We are no longer the observer and the subject of the familiar
world in which we are. It is still the same world, it is the same cloud that we are seeing,
but our perspective has been oriented in a new way. As the subject, I am studying in the
school, though the question as to whether the cloud sees me, cannot be answered from
the boundaries of our ordinary experience of the world. In a certain way, such a
reflection transcends the world of state of affairs, while also incorporating it into its
essence. The question implicates a meditative comportment toward the world, which
makes space for a unique experience of being-in-the-world. Ueda considers such an
experience to be a religious one, as we can observe especially in mysticism, as well as
in Zen thinking (Ueda, 2011: 770).20
For Ueda, a pure experience of the world in Zen specifically means a journeying
between where we find ourselves in the everyday world and the place of nothingness.
Put differently, our ordinary world is enveloped by the topos of original nothingness.
We should be careful here as not to place the mystical experience of the world merely
against the ordinary experience of the world. This is precisely where we the see the
necessary two-way movement at stake: ordinary language allows us to experience the
ordinary world, which is where the mystical experience of the world emerges. In turn,
from the mystical experience of the world, we are referred back to our ordinary world.
The hollowness and actuality at hand are intertwined through a constant interplay.
Altogether, this amounts to the notion of language not as a mere system of signs, but as
the place of a hermeneutic movement in and through which a pure experience of the
world turns out to be possible.
As I have indicated above, Ueda’s idea of language can be made sense of from a
topological point: language involves both “space-making” and “limitation”. Inasmuch
as the world is opened up through words, it is also bound by them. For Ueda, language
can be distinguished from the world, even if the meaning of space in question is
primarily accessible via linguistic expressions. In that sense, the question whether the
nature of language is inside or outside of language is important. At first, there seems to
be two possibilities, which are two extreme views: (1) Everything remains inside of
language, because even the question concerning the nature of language appears within
the boundaries of language. (2) We can move outside of language, since language is
only an instrument that obstructs our access to the pure experience of phenomena. Yet,
20 Davis explains this point as follows: “Zen is not an otherworldly mysticism; it is rather a “non-mysticism”
(G. Nicht-Mystik, J. hishinpi-shugi非神秘主義) or “de-mysticism” that repeatedly passes through and beyond a
silent state of unio mystica on the way back to a nondual (that is, “not one and not two”) experience of living in
the linguistically articulated world of plurality (Davis, 2019: 717).
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Ueda offers a third way: the dynamic movement of “exiting language and then exiting
into language”, (Ueda, 2011: 768) which is a movement only the poetic language
permits. The poetic essence of language signifies the movement from and into silence,
where the core matter of words becomes explicit, yet, neither “within” nor “outside” of
language, but at the very limit of language. This is an experience that strikes us in
situations when we feel the need to say “Oh!”, namely when we are at a loss for words.
Ueda writes: “Language is torn through into silence and silence is torn through into
language. It is precisely this movement that is primordial experience, which altogether I
understand as a living wellspring of the death and resuscitation of experience” (Ueda,
2011: 768). This occurs precisely when we experience the gap between the “word” and
the “thing”, a topos which Ueda defines to be the hollow space of “no-
meaning” (2011: 769). The two-way movement that becomes apparent in poetic
words signifies the movement from language into silence and vice versa. This
is where the core matter of language becomes explicit, neither “within” nor
“outside” language, but at the very “limit” of our dialogue with language. As
such, the movement at stake is not a “smooth and automatic” one, it is a
movement of “twofold breaking through”. (Ueda, 2011: 768).
When we experience the void between “words” and “things”, the experience of the
world overflows us; this is the pure experience of the world. To put otherwise, the
world makes sense to us in a genuine way especially in moments when we can place
ourselves in the constant dialogue between words and things. What that means is, the
pure experience of the world amounts to neither “things-in-themselves” signified with
pure words, nor solely to their ordinary representations, but to the experience of being
placed in the dynamic between. In poetic language, we become the listeners of that
dialogue. This is also the dialogue between the sayable and unsayable, the hollow and
the actual, which displays a back-and-forth movement that is preserved and embodied
especially in Zen thinking between “zazen and sanzen” (Davis, 2019: 728), reflecting
the stillness of language and the speaking of stillness.
In that regard, let me draw a similarity between Heidegger and Ueda’s way of
thinking language. Heidegger’s interpretation of kotoba involves a similar attempt of
exiting into and from dialogue, calling us to confront the boundaries of our world of
meaning. Heidegger specifically mentions the idea of the “way-making movement” of
language (Be-wëgung) in his work (US 186/91), which amounts to the un-concealment
of the event of language in the dialogue between dictionary words and poetic words.
When we let the language speak of itself, it speaks through us via stillness; when we
speak about language, it stops speaking of stillness and becomes simply mute. While
for Heidegger, an authentic mode of saying needs to be silent about silence and saying
is the disclosure of the way of saying, for Ueda, the authentic self is selfless, endowed
with an experience of the two-foldness of the world. Ueda’s idea of language comes to
the fore in its full clarity as he writes: “language is indeed the seal of self-awareness of a
human being’s actual existence and hollow-existence within a twofold hollow-expanse/
world” (Ueda, 2011: 775). In a similar vein of thought, in Heidegger’s essay the
interlocutors converse not only about the nature of a language, just as they are not
only silent about the meaning of a dialogue. What is at stake goes beyond the limits of a
mere inter-subjective communication. The more profound significance of the dialogue,
therefore, lies in the movement that occurs between the hollow expanse and the
ordinary world. It can be argued that through his essay Heidegger wishes to point
The Journal of East Asian Philosophy
toward the pre-subjective and pre-objective topos of the dialogue, namely to its way-
making and appearance in the openness of language. This is similar to Ueda’s idea of
kotoba, as he writes, “while revealing beings and while reflecting being as a whole,
words are “hollow words” that reflectively expose the hollow-expanse or “absolute
nothingness” in which being as a whole is located” (Ueda, 2011: 778). This third level
of meaningfulness, namely the space of no-meaning, envelops, first, the signification of
things, and second, the signification of the world in which the event of language takes
place. Only by our listening to the hollowness of actuality and the actuality of
hollowness in their twofold correlation, can language freely move and become what
it is.
7 Conclusion
The conversation between Heidegger and Japanese philosophy is situated in the region
of “letting-be”, which underpins the stillness of kotoba. Thinking with Ueda, we grasp
the free space from which to see ourselves, namely, the perspective of the hollow
expanse that shows forth the limits of language. With a similar conception of kotoba,
Heidegger attempts to overcome the idea of a dialogue as a mere exchange of opinions
and information. One of the most important conclusions that we can draw from this
comparison is that all conversations first need their interlocutors to be in a conversation
with the language itself. The true character of Heidegger’s conversation with Tezuka,
then, can neither be found in Heidegger’s “actual” encounter with Tezuka, nor merely
in Heidegger’s “hollow” essay. Departing from Ueda’s account of kotoba, it appears
that a genuine conversation can only be located in the dialogue of actuality and
hollowness, which finds it expression in the two-fold breakthrough of poetic language.
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